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Crossing a river is one of the most dangerous military operations. But if the U.S. military were to go to war tomorrow, it would lack the equipment, doctrine and experience to launch attacks across defended rivers, according to one Army engineer.
“The Army has not conducted such operations since World War II,” Army Engineer Maj. Aditya Iyer wrote in the paper. essay For the Association of the United States Army. For example, Army divisions do not have sufficient bridging capabilities on their own to conduct what the Army calls a “wet gap” attack, requiring support from corps-level forces that may not be available. Become.
“Current Wetland Gap crossing doctrine, organization, materiel, and leadership are ineffective for corps-independent division-level Wetland Gap crossing operations,” Iyer warned. River crossings are especially dangerous. This is because vehicles in groups can be targeted as they cross the river en masse, or even be stranded on the opposite bank against a larger enemy.
As an example of ignoring river attacks, Iyer points out: Big failure What happened when Russia tried to cross the Siversky Donets River in May 2022. The 74th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade attempted to attack using a mobile pontoon. As a result, an estimated 500 casualties and dozens of tanks were lost.
Ayer cited several mistakes by Russian commanders, including attacking only one point on the river, lack of advance reconnaissance, and attacking during the day rather than at night. “In contrast, the Ukrainian military had accurate intelligence indicating that Russian troops were concentrating along the river,” Ayer said. “Ukrainian engineer reconnaissance teams had also identified potential river crossing points and pre-arranged artillery targets at the crossing points, and they were right. Russian forces actually used those points.”
To be fair, the U.S. military also has a checkered history with river raids.in battle of fredericksburg In December 1862, the Union Army made a foolish and bloody attempt. Crossing the Rappahannock River against entrenched Confederate defenders. In January 1944, the U.S. 36th Infantry Division launched an ill-prepared and disastrous night attack across the country. rapid river There were approximately 2,000 casualties in Italy (outraged survivors prompted a parliamentary inquiry after the war).
In fact, when World War II began, the Army was unprepared for the crossing. Divisions did not have sufficient bridge facilities, including bridges strong enough to withstand the weight of tanks, so they relied on corps-level assets. There was also no central authority to coordinate complex cross-functional operations. But by then, Looting operation – The great raid across the Rhine in 1945 involved a million soldiers and nearly 6,000 pieces of artillery – many of these problems had been resolved.Crossing the Rhine was also used. US Navy landing craft Usually used for amphibious attacks on the ocean.
In fact, it is now even more difficult to cross the river. Tactics used by commanders like Napoleon (e.g., surprise drops into weakly held points, feints to hide the actual point of passage), such as in Ukraine, where drones are constantly flying overhead. It becomes much more difficult. If the enemy were able to locate the crossing point, they could cover the beachhead with long-range missile and artillery fire.
In counterinsurgency operations in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan and Iraq, this was less of a problem. Large-scale combat operations against Russia or China will be different, especially in regions rich in rivers and canals like Eastern Europe. “The Russo-Ukrainian war will require that military technology has evolved in recent decades and that the U.S. military must be prepared to conduct cross-swamp operations against well-organized and technologically advanced forces.” “It highlighted this,” Iyer said.
A 3rd Infantry Division armored utility vehicle departs from a barge of the 497th Multipurpose Bridge Company, 92nd Engineer Battalion, Sept. 21, 2023.
Kevin Larson/U.S. Army
The Army’s current wet gap deficiencies are similar to those of World War II. The engineer battalion of a division or brigade combat team does not have sufficient bridging capabilities of its own. The department will use at least four multipurpose bridge companies to cross the 400 meters (1,312 feet) of river. However, these special bridging companies are controlled by Corps Headquarters.
“Each division relies on corps reinforcement for wet gap operations, including gendarmerie and other enablers such as smoke screens,” Iyer noted. The Army also does not have enough multi-role bridge companies to support all of its divisions.
Additionally, many of the Army’s bridges, such as improved ribbon bridges, are not strong enough to withstand the weight of large vehicles such as the 70-ton M1 Abrams tank. “Current bridge equipment has the same capacity deficiencies as it did during World War II,” Iyer said.
The Army also needs a focused doctrine for river-crossing operations, not just building bridges or methods of capturing and securing beachheads. “Publications remain technically focused on engineer considerations and calculations for performing the traverse,” Iyer said.
Having the engineering ability to quickly build a bridge across a mile-long river is no small feat. The question is whether it can be done if the enemy opposes it.
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy Magazine, and other publications. He holds a master’s degree in political science from Rutgers University.please follow him twitter and linkedin.